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Clio As Hostage: The United States Supreme
Court and the Uses of History
WILLIAM M. WIECEK*
INTRODUCTION
The historian** who considers the uses to which the United
States Supreme Court has subjected the past comes to think that
history ought to be brought within the coverage of FIFRA1,
treated as if it were an insecticide toxic to humans, and required
to bear this warning label: "Caution: Inept or improper use of this
product may be dangerous to your civic health."
This, of course, is an old complaint. For the past half-century,
historians, judges, and lawyers have bemoaned the ways that the
Court has misunderstood, misapplied, or otherwise abused the
past on its way to formulating doctrines for the present. But this
trite topic is still worth a fresh look, not for purposes of flogging
once again the dead horse of bad judicial history, but rather to
understand the consequences of applied history, good or bad, in
the evolution of doctrine. For wheli we trace out these conse-
quences, we will be astonished to see the extent to which his-
tory-that is the judges' understanding of the past, right or
wrong, correct or confused-has shaped doctrine and has affected
society. Even the constitutional historian, who has worked with
these materials throughout a professional lifetime, is surprised to
discover how pervasive have been the effects of history in the
evolution of doctrine.
On reflection, though, this should not come as a surprise. The
United States Supreme Court is the only institution in human ex-
perience that has the power to declare history: that is, to articu-
late some understanding of the past and then compel the rest of
* Chester Adgate Congdon Professor of Public Law and Legislation, Syracuse Uni-
versity, College of Law. Ph.D, University of Wisconsin; LL.B, Harvard Law School, A.B.,
Catholic University.
** I benefitted from the opportunity of exploring some of the ideas of this paper, and
of refining them on the basis of auditors' comments, in presentations to the Institute of
United States Studies, the University of London, June 1987, and to the Association of
American Law Schools' Conference on Teaching Constitutional Law, October 1987. For
this opportunity, I am grateful to the organizers, particularly Professors Peter J. Parish and
John E. Nowak, respectively. I also wish to thank Colleen Grzeskowiaic for research
assistance.
1. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 7, U.S.C. § 136 (1982).
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society to conform its behavior to that understanding. No Minis-
try of State Security, no Thought Police, has ever succeeded in
establishing such authority. This power exists irrespective of the
degree to which that judicial perception of the past conforms to
reality. Even where the Court's history is at odds with the actual
past, that judicial history, as absorbed into a decision, and then a
doctrine, becomes the progenitor of a rule of law. So without bela-
boring once more Justice Robert H. Jackson's concession that
"judges often are not thorough or objective historians, ' 2 it is
worth our effort to review the impact of judicial history on the
evolution of doctrine and on the consequences of that doctrine
when applied as a rule for the governance of people.
I. A CONCEPTUAL SURVEY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF
HISTORY
It might be useful to begin with a theoretical framework, in
order to provide a map of terrain unfamiliar to non-historians and
to give some sense of where the inquiry can lead. Many scholars
in the past three decades have studied the uses of history in Su-
preme Court adjudication, 3 but for present purposes the most use-
ful theoretical survey was tiat of the lawyer-historian Alfred H.
Kelly: Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, published in
1966.' Kelly there identified four modes in which the Court uses
history. Two are routine, relatively non-controversial, and of lesser
interest for our immediate purposes. They are, first, the place of
historical inquiry in the methodology of judicial process in a com-
mon-law system, where the role of precedent and the principle of
stare decisis are crucial.5 Second, when construing statutes,
American courts regularly investigate statutory history and seek
evidence of legislative intent.'
2. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1945).
3. Including A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969);
HURST, THE ROLE OF HISTORY, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 55-58 (Cahn, ed.
1954); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History In Constitutional Interpretation,
31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964); Klinkhamer, The Use of History in the Supreme Court,
1789-1835, 36 U. DET. L.J. 553 (1959); DALY, THE USE OF HISTORY IN THE DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT, 1900-1930 (1954); M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS:
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965).
4. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119.
5, To say that the problem of precedent and stare decisis is uninteresting for our
purposes is not to say that it is unimportant. On the contrary, those problems have seen the
subject of probing and contentious analysis. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS (1921); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949); Boudin, The
Problem of Stare Decisis in our Constitutional Theory, 8 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1931).
6. Again, the present lack of importance for this inquiry does not mean that the
topic is trivial or undebated. See, as one example of how this problem has burned brightly
[Vol. 24
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CLIO AS HOSTAGE
Kelly was moved to write his critical article by two other and
more germane uses of history. He called the first, history by "judi-
cial fiat" or history by "authoritative revelation." 7 The cases he
chose as illustrative are well-known. For example, in the
Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), Justice Samuel Miller, writing for
the majority, introduced his construction of the meaning of the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments with this bit of historical
judicial fiat:
The most cursory glance at these articles discloses a unity of
purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the times,
which cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question
of doubt concerning their true meaning. Nor can such doubts,
when any reasonably exist, be safely and rationally solved with-
out a reference to that history .. . Fortunately that history is
fresh within the memory of us all, and its leading features, as
they bear on the matter before us, free from doubt. . . Un-
doubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause [of the war of
the rebellion] was African slavery.'
I will return later to the consequences of this particular historical
ipse dixit;9 for now, it serves to illustrate history by authoritative
revelation. Kelly's second example of this technique is drawn from
Justice Henry B. Brown's majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson
(1896):
The objective of the [Fourteenth] Amendment was undoubtedly
to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law,
but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as dis-
tinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two
races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.10
I will return to this case, too."'
Chief Justice John Marshall was a master of the judicial-fiat
technique, not only in his use of history, but in his entire judicial
style. Almost all his great opinions contain at least one example of
history-by-fiat. The most important was Marbury v. Madison
(1803), where he surveyed the export-tax, Bill of Attainder, and
in judicial-academic debates, Crosskey, Charles Fairman, 'Legislative History,' and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1954) and Fairman's
response, Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. Cm L. REV. 144 (1954). The
closely-related problem of legislative motivation is the subject of considerable modern in-
terest: see Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 925 (1978); Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970).
7. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 122-25.
8. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-68 (1873).
9. See infra notes 194-220 and accompanying text.
10. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
11. See infra notes 232-236 and accompanying text.
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Treason clauses of the Constitution12 as a way of reaching this
sweeping conclusion: "From these and many other selections
which might be made, it is apparent, that the Framers of the con-
stitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the govern-
ment of courts, as well as of the legislature."' 3 Marshall drew on
a similarly-reconstructed Framers' intent to interpret the contracts
clause in Fletcher v. Peck (1810)14 and Sturges v. Crowninshield
(1819);15 to develop an expansive reading of the commerce clause
in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824);16 and to ground the Constitution in
an historic act of popular sovereignty in McCulloch v. Maryland
(1819). 17
It was the fourth category that most troubled Kelly. He re-
ferred to it as "law-office history," a selective technique trans-
ferred from brief writing, where it is arguably appropriate, to
opinion writing, where it often is disastrous, weakening rather
than strengthening the force of the point the author is trying to
make. Usually associated with some form of judicial activism,
law-office history appeals to judges as a "precedent-breaking de-
vice" that enables the judge to pass through or around inconve-
nient precedents inimical to a desired result, and to discover some
presumed original intent more congenial to that result.' 8 Kelly's
principal illustrative cases, both of which had to be reversed by
constitutional amendment, were Dred Scott (1857) and the In-
come Tax Cases (1895). In Scott v. SandfordI9 Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney drafted law-office history with a reckless opportu-
nism to avoid the precedent of American Insurance Co. v. Canter
(1825).2 0 Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller resorted to similar tac-
tics in his opinions in Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co.
(1895)21 to evade two precedents, Hylton v. United States
(1796)22 and Springer v. United States (1881),23 that would have
supported the constitutionality of a federal tax on incomes.
Kelly's catalogue did not exhaust the uses made of history by
the United States Supreme Court. At least three others may be
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Respectively: US. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; art. I,
§ 9, cl. 4; art. III, § 3.
13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803).
14. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122, 206 (1819).
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
17. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
18. Kelly, supra note 4, at 125-28.
19. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1956).
20. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1825) (supporting broad congressional power to regulate
the territories, a position Taney was determined to reject in the latter half of his opinion).
21. 157 U.S. 429 (1895) and 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
22. 3 US. (3 DalI.) 171 (1796).
23. 102 U.S. 586 (1881).
[Vol. 24
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identified. First, history serves as a lode of values that the Court
mines in giving content to the generalities of the Constitution.",
On this use, Justice Felix Frankfurter's "two-clause theory" of ju-
dicial interpretation is instructive. In his concurring opinion in
United States v. Lovett (1946),25 Frankfurter drew a distinction,
which he reiterated and amplified later, 26 between those clauses of
the Constitution that are specific and whose meaning therefore
must be specifically defined by the understanding of the Framers
(Frankfurter's example: the Bill of Attainder clauses2 7), and those
which are vaguely worded (his example again: the due process,
equal protection and just compensation clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments), and thus can be given content only by
judicial interpretation of those "broad standards of fairness writ-
ten into the Constitution. 28
The role. of history was radically different for each of these
types of clauses, in Frankfurter's view. For the specific clauses,
history disclosed a single correct result. Judges were obliged to
discover that correct reading, and then to follow it undeviatingly.
J. Willard Hurst later refined Frankfurter's notion: "if the idea of
a document of superior legal authority is to have meaning, terms
which have a precise, history-filled content to those who drafted
and adopted the document must be held to that precise mean-
ing."'29 For the open-ended clauses, however, history's function
was to serve as a repository of human experience and societal val-
ues derived from that experience. Judges could draw on those his-
torically-illuminated values, and were not as straitly constrained
in their interpretation as they were with respect to the specific-
clause values. For the latter, the Framers' intent was controlling
and conclusive; but for open-ended-clause values, the historical ex-
perience of the American people after the drafting of the clause
became relevant.
Next, some justices have used history to refute interpretations
or results reached by their brethren. The most spectacular exam-
ple of this in the Court's two centuries was the Frankfurter-Black
debate that began with the 1947 decision in Adamson v. Califor-
nia30 over total versus selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights
24. Wyzanski, History and Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 237 (1959).
25. 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946).
26. Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
27. U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 9, 10.
28. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946).
29. HURST, supra note 3, at 57. Hurst specified that he was referring only to "partic-
ular legal agencies" and "particular legal procedures," not general grants of power or stan-
dards of conduct.
30. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
1988]
5
Wiecek: Clio As Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
by the fourteenth amendment. Justice Hugo Black there rejected
the selective-incorporation tradition that had been suggested in
Twining v. New Jersey (1908)31 and eloquently affirmed by Jus-
tice Benjamin N. Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (1937),31 de-
fending his total-incorporation alternative in a twenty-four-page
dissent supplemented by a thirty-one-page purely historical appen-
dix. "a Frankfurter, in his Adamson concurrence, rejected Black's
historical reconstruction invoking his own interpretation of "the
heritage of the past" to refute Black's. 4 The debate continued on
the Court for a decade and a half, while commentators off the
Court ranged on one side or the other.35
Other conspicuous recent examples of Justices using history to
refute doctrine include Justice John M. Harlan's futile dissent in
Baker v. Carr (1962) demonstrating that the egalitarian assump-
tions of Justice William J. Brennan's majority opinion flew in the
face of American historical experience."8 Somewhat more success-
ful, though not yet triumphant as of this writing, have been the
efforts by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William H.
Rehnquist to dethrone Thomas Jefferson's wall of separation met-
aphor in establishment clause cases as it was adopted by Justice
Black in Everson v. Board of Education (1947).3 7
A third use of history beyond those noted by Kelly lies in its
value as a medium of a liberal education. The nineteenth-century
lawyer and treatise-writer Theodore Sedgwick glimpsed this possi-
bility in his treatise on statutory construction: "What is required
[in construing constitutions and statutes is] that thorough intellec-
tual training, that complete education of the mind, which lead it
to a correct result, wholly independent of rules, and indeed, almost
31. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
32. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
33. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-123.
34. Id. at 65. See generally W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER:
CONFLICT IN THE COURT (1961).
35. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, 'Legisla-
tive History' and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1959). Justice Black conceded nothing to what most commentators viewed as a devastat-
ing critique by Prof. Fairman of his views. See his concurring opinion in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 165-67 (1968).
36. 369 U.S. 186, 330-49 (1962).
37. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123
(1982)(Burger, C.J.: the metaphor is only a "useful signpost," not a doctrine); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)(Burger, C.J.: "the metaphor itself is not a wholly
accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between
church and state.") See generally Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jeffer-
son's Crumbling Wall - A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770-87
(1984).
[Vol. 24
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unconscious of the process by which the end is attained." 3 Judge
Learned Hand developed this theme, specifying the content of this
liberal education:
It is as important to a judge called upon to pass on a question of
constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with
Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle,
with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli,
Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as
with books which have been specifically written on this subject.
For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he
approaches the question before him.3"
When utilized in this mode, history never has a direct application
to a specific problem. Rather, it broadens a judge's outlook, en-
larges his or her experience vicariously, suggests that the present
is not inevitable, and displays humanity in its infinite heterogene-
ity. John G. Wofford expressed this function nicely: "history does
not provide the answers to the problems of today; it merely helps
to frame the questions."'40 History-as-liberal-education is stub-
bornly anti-instrumental: it kicks the traces and will not permit
itself to be used for any purpose other than deepening a judge's
wisdom.
Such an anti-instrumentalist conception of history confronts a
challenge issued by Paul Murphy, one of the premier constitu-
tional historians at work in the United States today. In Time to
Reclaim: The Current Challehge of American Constitutional His-
tory4 1 Murphy chided his fellow-historians for abandoning consti-
tutional history to the lawyers, and suggested that if professional
historians reclaimed the field, they might banish the perverted
uses of the subject, such as law-office history, by feeding good his-
tory to the judges. Better that history be done right, he urged,
than that it be left to amateurish advocates who would prostitute
Clio to their needs of the moment. Yet in spite of the great
amount of excellent work done in the field of constitutional history
in the past quarter-century, Murphy's call has gone unheeded.
There are many reasons for this: for one, judges, the intended con-
sumers and beneficiaries of this instrumentalist professional his-
tory, have been largely indifferent to the opportunity. But there is
also the sense, shared by both judge-consumer and historian-pur-
veyor, that history can seldom be put to instrumentalist uses. The
38. 2 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETA-
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW 192 (1874).
39. Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1930).
40. Wofford, supra note 3, at 533.
41. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional
History, 69 Am. HisT. REV. 64-79 (1963).
19881
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occasions for construing Frankfurter's specific, historically-defined
clauses seldom arise in the United States Supreme Court, and
when they do, the certainty that Frankfurter expected historical
research to provide proves illusory.
An illustration, provided fittingly enough by Frankfurter him-
self, demonstrates the deceptive quality of his dichotomy. It might
seem obvious to common sense that when the Framers used the
word "State" in the Constitution, it had a specific meaning-New
Hampshire, New York, et al.- and thus excluded other polities,
such as the District of Columbia.42 That is the way that Frank-
furter himself thus read it, at least for purposes of construing Ar-
ticle III's grant of diversity jurisdiction.43 Yet two of his col-
leagues explicitly disagreed with him there, and the District is a
"State" for such purposes as conferring United States citizenship
upon persons born there, defining interstate commerce, and innu-
merable other statutory objectives of Congress." In any event,
Clio is no one's unthinking servant. When invoked with a sensitiv-
ity to the integrity of the past-Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo be-
ing the exemplar here4 5 -history can shed light over an entire le-
gal landscape. But such an opportunity seldom presents itself to a
judge, and Clio's role is usually much less in the foreground.
Finally, there are times when both judge and historian should
recognize that history is simply beside the point. The historical
data that is available is either insufficient, or is hopelessly ambigu-
ous, or simply cannot be made germane to our purposes. Justice
Jackson forthrightly captured this sense of futility and ambiva-
lence in his Steel Seizure Case concurrence:
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned
had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from
materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called
upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan
debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only
supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on
each side of any question. They largely cancel each other.46
In such a case, the judge must transcend history, as the Su-
42. John Marshall thus construed it in the case of first impression on this issue:
Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
43. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 653 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
44. U.S CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1; art. I, § 8, clause 3. On the unique status of the
District as a "State" in a qualified sense, see Metropolitan R.R. v. District of Columbia,
132 U.S. 1 (1889). But see Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (District of
Columbia not a "State" as the term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), the modern codifica-
tion of § 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
(1973) (District of Columbia not a "state" as the term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
45. E.g., Beers v. Hotchkiss, 256 N.Y. 41 (Ct. App. 1931).
46. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952).
[Vol. 24
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preme Court did in Brown v. Board of Education (1954)."' After
initial argument, the Court ordered reargument directed specifi-
cally at historical questions: the intentions and understanding of
the Framers. Despite exhaustive efforts on both sides, Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren concluded that, although historical "sources cast
some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we
are faced. At best, they are inconclusive."4 Brown is a much
stronger opinion for this forthright admission than it would have
been if the Court had tried to tease or torture some meaning from
the vast but conflicting historical data.
With this conceptual survey of the way that the Court has used
history in mind, let us turn to see what actually happens when the
Court invokes Clio. This inquiry will lead us along two different
paths. The first will review an unrelated assortment of cases, al-
most all of them decided in the twentieth century, that deal with
three constitutional issues: the freedom of political expression, fed-
eral common law, and the right of intimate association. For these,
no single theme emerges; rather, we have a sampling of the
Court's uses of history, instructive principally about the innumera-
ble possibilities and consequences of the historical approach. The
second path displays a topical unity: cases, all of them from the
nineteenth century, dealing with status and rights of black people
in slavery, crypto-servitude, and quasi-freedom. These cases con-
vey a single lesson: how far reaching and catastrophic the misuse
of history can be in judicial opinions.
II. SPECIFIC USES OF HISTORY BY THE COURT
A. Freedom of Political Expression Cases
Let us begin with a topic that presents an embarras de richesse
of history-in-the-service-of-law: those involving freedom of politi-
cal expression, a subject besotted with history. At the onset of the
first Red Scare, the United States Supreme Court had available to
it two inconsistent sources of precedent, each deeply rooted in his-
tory, to guide its response to government efforts to suppress politi-
cal speech during World War I. The first derived from William
Blackstone's complacent endorsement of the doctrine of seditious
libel4 9; the second, from Americans' rejection of the position ex-
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. Id. at 489.
49. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765), IV, 151. This position en-
joyed eminent support on this side of the Atlantic: W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1825), 119-120; J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1293-1294, 1880-1892 (1835).
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tolled by Blackstone.5" The Court's earliest decisions on this sub-
ject were almost without exception contra-libertarian, attributing
slight or no worth to first amendment values. In the judgment of
the leading scholar who has investigated this subject, "a general
hostility to the value of free expression permeated the judicial sys-
tem,"'" both state and federal, before 1917. These decisions sub-
sumed both the incitement and the bad-tendency tests usually as-
sociated with a later era."2 Justice Henry B. Brown drew a
peculiar lesson from the English past in Robertson v. Baldwin
(1897): the Bill of Rights was not meant by its Framers "to lay
down any novel principles of government," but rather to embed
certain English "guaranties and immunities" into the Constitu-
tion. These however, were, and continued to be "subject to certain
well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case.
In incorporating these principles into the fundamental law there
was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued
to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed."" a These
dicta constituted an exception ready to swallow up the rule. Thus
it was in keeping with established American traditions when the
World War I era freedom of speech cases moved toward adoption
of a repressive bad tendency test, affirming convictions under the
Espionage Act of 1917 and its 1918 amendment popularly known
as the Sedition Act.54
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. played a pivotal role in
these developments. He was, of course, the author of the clear-
and-present-danger test 55 that for half a century was the bedrock
of first amendment law. Holmes was a superb, if unreliable, legal
historian, and history played an important role in shaping his
thought. But his attitudes toward history were curiously ambiva-
lent. Holmes often insisted that law should emerge out of the his-
50. See the arguments of Andrew Hamilton, counsel for John Peter Zenger, in the
latter's celebrated 1735 trial for seditious libel, in J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF
THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 23-26 (Katz, ed. 1963); St. George Tucker,
ed., Blackstone's Commentaries... (1803), vol. I, part 2, appendix note G, "Of the Right
of Conscience, and of the Freedom of Speech and of the Press," pp. 11-30; T. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITArIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 429 (1868).
51. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 557
(1981). But see Anderson, The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory, 1870-1915,
24 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 56 (1980).
52. E.g., Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
53. 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
54. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217; Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40
Stat. 553; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Pierce v. United
States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
55. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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torical experience of the people: "upon this point a page of history
is worth a volume of logic," he once wrote.5 6 He maintained that
the "rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of
history", and extolled historical knowledge as "the first step to-
ward an enlightened skepticism. ' 57 Yet he also cautioned that "we
must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism." "It is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."58
Thus while respecting the momentum of historical development
behind the bad tendency test,59 Holmes was capable of viewing
that historical growth at arms-length.
Holmes was nudged away from his implicit endorsement of
bad-tendency in Schenck by a number of pressures. These in-
cluded: the ferocity and malice displayed by the prosecution in
one of the later speech cases, Abrams v. United States,60; friendly
criticism from Zechariah Chafee,61 Ernst Freund,62 and Learned
Hand ' 3 then a federal District Judge in New York's Southern
District, who had provided his own alternative test for testing
freedom of expression against statutory restraint.64 Holmes re-
sponded by articulating a more speech-sensitive standard in his
Abrams dissent, in a famous passage that began the tradition of
kicking the corpse of the 1798 Sedition Act:
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the
first amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in
force. History seems to me against this notion. I had conceived
that the United States through many years had shown its repen-
tance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it
imposed. 5
56. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
57. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
58. Id. at 474, 469.
59. On the anti-libertarian emphases of Holmes' earlier (i.e., pre-1919) opinions, see
Rogat and O'Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion - The Speech Cases, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1349 (1984).
60. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). On these non-doctrinal aspects of this case, see R.
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT AND FREE
SPEECH (1987).
61. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the
Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 JOURNAL OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 24-45 (1971).
62. Kalven and Ginsburg, Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U.
Cm. L. REv. 235 (1973).
63. Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975).
64. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
65. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
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Professor Zechariah Chafee of the Harvard Law School later
propagated the notion that Holmes' original formulation of the
clear-and-present-danger test in Schenck v. United States was a
libertarian doctrine 6 , and his contemporary criticisms, delivered
in print and vis-a-vis, probably contributed to Holmes' reconsider-
ation of his original views in the Abrams dissent.
While Holmes had spoken on both sides of the issue, his breth-
ren decisively opted for the speech-suppressive, Blackstonian tra-
dition, and would continue to adhere to it for another genera-
tion. 7 This provoked Justice Louis D. Brandeis into what is surely
the most eloquent piece of history by judicial fiat in all the
volumes of the United States Reports, his stirring call to civic
courage in the Whitney concurrence: 68 "Men feared witches and
burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears." His elaboration of this point is too
well known to bear repeating here; what must be stressed in the
present context, however, is that the core of Brandeis' argument
was derived wholly from his recreation of the Framers' intent
(some69 would say his fabrication of that intent):
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth; ... that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.7 1
Brandeis' recreation of history, in its turn, became the basis of
the Court's gradual rejection of the anti-libertarian tradition. His
history-by-judicial-fiat took on a life of its own, eroding the Black-
stonian heritage. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes found in the
first amendment's press clause implicit guaranties of freedom that
went beyond the narrow confines of the English tradition: "the
criticism upon Blackstone's statement has not been because immu-
nity from previous restraint upon publication has not been re-
garded as deserving of special emphasis, but chiefly because that
immunity cannot be deemed to exhaust the conception of the lib-
erty guaranteed by state and federal constitutions. '7 1 In the same
spirit, he turned the English tradition against Blackstone, arguing
66. Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 86 (1941).
67. The foremost example of this endorsement, without historical argumentation,
was Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
68. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
69. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. I
(1971).
70. 274 U.S. at 375.
71. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714-15 (1931). See also Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248 (1936).
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from its libertarian components, such as John Milton's Aeropagit-
ica, that "the struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily
directed against the power of the licensor. ' '1 2 On the eve of
America's entry into World War II, Justice Black carried this
idea further, interpreting American historical experience to
demonstrate that the purpose of the first amendment was to reject
English common law concerning press and speech entirely, substi-
Luting for it a much more libertarian outlook, freedom of "the
broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly
society. ' 73
After World War II and the demise of the second Red Scare,
the Brandeisian reading of history gradually emerged as the core
meaning of the speech and press clauses of the first amendment.74
Even in the Dennis case of 1951, where Chief Justice Fred Vinson
adopted Learned Hand's retrograde bad-tendency reformulation
of the Holmes clear-and-present-danger test, the plurality con-
ceded that since Whitney, "subsequent opinions have inclined to-
ward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale." 75 Justice William Brennan
rode Whitney's momentum to extend the now-established absolute
hostility to seditious libel in the American tradition to private li-
bel, first in the context of a civil suit seeking damages against a
newspaper,7 6 then to a criminal prosecution for defamation." In
the former case, New York Times v. Sullivan, he made the odd
pronouncement that "the court of history" had declared the 1798
Sedition Act unconstitutional. 8 The complete triumph of Bran-
deis came in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)," 9 a per curiam opinion
that virtually overruled Whitney.
But by one of history's perverse ironies, while judicial history
was marching in one direction in the United States Supreme
Court, professional history and the uses made of history by non-
historians were going off in other and inconsistent directions, thus
undercutting the Court's history. In 1960, Leonard Levy, one of
72. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
73. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 (1941).
74. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment", 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191-222 (1964).
75. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951). Justice Frankfurter, concur-
ring, made an altogether different use of the past, declaring "History teaches that the
independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions
of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, eco-
nomic and social pressures." Id. at 525. This lesson of history affirmed for him the wisdom
of two cardinal tenets of his juridical philosophy: judicial restraint and the application of
balancing tests in first amendment cases.
76. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
77. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
78. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
79. 395 U.S. 444 (1979).
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America's foremost constitutional historians, published Legacy of
Suppression, an almost-polemical historical study, arguing that
"the generation which adopted the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights did not believe in a broad scope for freedom of expression,
particularly in the realm of politics."8 0 He maintained, contra to
the Chafee-libertarian interpretation, that the founding generation
embraced a Blackstonian view. Understandably, such a conclusion
dismayed advocates of broad first amendment freedom like Justice
Black, who directed one of his law clerks to conduct research,
eventually occupying an entire summer, that might prove Levy's
thesis wrong. (The effort was unsuccessful, though that did not
change Justice Black's views. It merely led him to refuse to read
Levy's next book-a wise decision, since Black regarded himself
as an ardent Jeffersonian. 1 ) Yet by an absurd twist that suggests
that Clio can be a lady of a whimsical turn of mind, Justice Bren-
nan, a leading architect of recent libertarian first amendment in-
terpretation, turned to Legacy of Suppression to support, not re-
fute, the basic postulate of New York Times v. Sullivan!
2
The other development moved in a direction opposite that of
Levy's scholarship, and may yet prove to be something of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Robert H. Bork, at the time a Professor at the
Yale Law School, delivered a lecture at the Indiana University
Law School in 1971 in which he explicitly attacked the triumph of
Brandeisian principles in Brandenburg."3 Arguing from the prem-
ises of Herbert Wechsler's 1959 call for judicial adherence to neu-
tral principles,8 Bork concluded the first amendment protects only
political speech and that "there should be no constitutional ob-
struction to laws making criminal any speech that advocates forci-
ble overthrow of the government or the violation of any law."85
80. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY vii (1960).
81. L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS xvii-xviii (1985). This volume is a recon-
sideration and revision of Legacy; with characteristic zest and wit, Levy c. 1985 corrects
Levy c. 1960. The book referred to in text is LEVY'S JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE
DARKER SIDE (1963), a study that fluttered the dovecotes of Charlottesville and other lo-
cales of Jeffersonian adulation.
82. 376 U.S. at 273: "This is the lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over
the Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 586, which first crystallized a national awareness of the
central meaning of the first amendment." See L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION supra
note 80 at 258.
83. Bork, supra note 69.
84. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959).
85. Bork, supra note 69, at 20.
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B. Federal Common Law Cases
Our next case study presents an altogether different picture of
the interplay between law and history, demonstrating the Court
not so much using history as being used by it. The landmark case
of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938)88 represents a confluence of
several streams of legal development: the political struggles over
the jurisdiction of federal courts; Justice Holmes' long struggle
against legal Platonism; the intellectual influence of America's
premier legal historian, Charles Warren; and the complex, fasci-
nating story of federal common law.
The tale begins with the apparently inexhaustible ambiguity of
Swift v. Tyson (1842),87 where Justice Joseph Story held that sec-
tion 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act,88 the Rules of Decision Act, "is
strictly limited to local statutes and local usages .. ., and does not
extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature,
the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in
the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."89 If the ambiguity of
this holding is limitless, there would seem to be no theoretical
limit to the commentary and controversy it might engender. After
the Civil War, those possibilities were fully realized.90
Scholars have suggested that Swift was dictated by Story's "at-
tempt to impose a pro commercial national legal order on unwill-
ing state courts" 91 or as an effort to expand the scope of judge-
made common law, particularly that made by federal judges, in
the teeth of popular codification movement of the time.9 2
Whatever Story's motivation, the Swift doctrine expanded beyond
the reaches of commercial law to such areas as torts,93 title to real
property (despite Swift's explicit exclusion of this subject),9 4 and,
most importantly, public bonds. This category, too, would seem to
have been excluded by Swift and the Rules of Decision Act, de-
86. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
87. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
88. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
89. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
90. Two excellent surveys are T. FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1979) and T. FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE:
THE SwIFr & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981).
91. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 250
(1977).
92. Note Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE L.J. 284 (1969).
93. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
94. Galpin v. Page, 9 Fed. Cas. 1113 (C.C.D.Cal. 1870)(No. 5205) (disapproving of
state supreme court decision upholding constructive service of process by publication on a
non-resident as the basis of state court jurisdiction in adjudication relating to title to real
property.)
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pending as it did on construction of state constitutions and stat-
utes, not common law. But that did not deter a Court roused to
indignation by debt repudiation undertaken by public authorities.
As Justice Noah Swayne intoned in the leading case of this genre,
Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1864): 95 "we shall never immolate truth,
justice, and the law because a state tribunal has erected the altar
and decreed the sacrifice."
Swift was not controversial before the Civil War, but its exten-
sion to politically-sensitive decisions during and after the war,
such as Gelpcke, swept its doctrine into the stream of controversy
over federal jurisdiction. As the federal courts took on expanded
jurisdiction during Reconstruction 6, they came to play an ever
more significant role in the functioning of the national economy,
in such things as supervising railroad receiverships. While their
role became more important, it also became more controversial,
particularly after the concurrent emergence of judicial activism
and the doctrine of substantive due process.
Swift's aggrandizement in the twentieth century provoked pow-
erful resistance, led by Holmes and Brandeis. Holmes had ex-
pressed skepticism about a neo-Platonic conception of law at least
since his cutting review of Christopher C. Langdell's Contracts
casebook in 1880, with its often-quoted aphorism, "the life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience." 9 When in 1910
the Supreme Court brought the topic of mineral leases and state
property law within Swift's ambit, Holmes countered Story's vi-
sion of law as derived from "general principles" with his own posi-
tivistic notion of law as a product of discrete law-givers, in this
case, the state courts.98 Holmes' view was primarily jurispruden-
tial, but he was also influenced by a view of history, articulated
for this topic by John Chipman Gray, the first in a line of promi-
nent Harvard Law School critics of Swift.99 In his lectures on ju-
risprudence, published as The Nature and Sources of the Law,
Gray patronizingly dismissed Story's work in Swift: "he was a
man of great learning, and of reputation for learning greater even
than the learning itself; he was occupied at the time in writing a
book on bills of exchange, which would, of itself, lead him to dog-
matize on the subject; ... he was fond of glittering generalities;
95. 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 175, 206-07 (1864).
96. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1876, 13 Am,. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 333 (1969); S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS
143-160 (1968).
97. Book Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233-35 (1880).
98. Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
99. This line of succession went from Gray through James B. Thayer, through Jo-
seph H. Beale, to Felix Frankfurter, with Charles Warren associated peripherally.
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and he was possessed by a restless vanity."100 Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen (1917), voiding a state workmen's compensation
statute on the grounds of its supposed conflict with the "general
principles" of admiralty law (and thus with grant of admiralty
jurisdiction to the federal courts) elicited Holmes' sneer that "the
common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the
articulate voice of some sovereign."10' The newly-appointed Jus-
tice Brandeis joined him in dissent.
Brandeis' hostility to Swift came as no surprise, but he reached
that position by a different route of historical interpretation than
had Holmes. He was the namesake of his uncle, Lewis N.
Dembitz, a practicing attorney from Louisville, Kentucky who
had published a learned historical survey of the law of his state,
Kentucky Jurisprudence.10 2 This book was tinged with a sense
that early Kentuckians were suspicious of federal courts because
they feared that out-of-state creditors, investors, and speculators
would use them to override Kentuckians' control of their own po-
litical economic destinies. Brandeis was deeply influenced by his
uncle and his writings. l03 He saw in his own times a mirror of
Kentucky's early statehood epoch, as federal courts became the
refuge of out-of-state economic interests who forum-shopped their
way out of state courts, state law, and state economic policy.
Brandeis' suspicions of the role of federal courts, widely shared
by his Progressive contemporaries, were amply confirmed in the
notorious Taxicab Case of 1928.104 Kentucky statutory law pro-
hibited corporations chartered by the state from entering into mo-
nopolistic contracts. Appellant, a Kentucky corporation, dissolved
itself and obtained a new charter in Tennessee, a state having no
such antimonopolistic statute, and then promptly entered into a
monopoly arrangement with a railroad whose Kentucky station it
served. It candidly admitted in its brief that it secured out-of-state
incorporation specifically to get diversity-of-citizenship status in
the inevitable litigation challenging its monopoly, so as to escape
Kentucky courts and laws for the friendlier climes of federal
courts, where it expected (and got) an application of "general
principles" of commercial law under Swift that would sustain its
monopoly contract and override the forum state's economic policy.
Holmes and Brandeis dissented, the former denouncing Swift
on the basis of a remarkable bit of research performed by the pre-
100. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 253 (2d. ed. 1921).
101. 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
102. L. DEMBITZ, KENTUCKY JURISPRUDENCE (1890).
103. P. STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 230 (1984).
104. Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
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eminent constitutional historian of the twentieth century, Charles
Warren. In a 1923 law review article,10 5 Warren disclosed that
the original drafts of the Rules of Decision Act among the papers
of the First Congress included the phrase "their unwritten and
common law now in use," contrary to Story's interpretation of
congressional intent in Swift. Seldom has legal research had such
a dramatic impact: within a decade, Swift would be overruled,
partly on the basis of Warren's archival labor.
But of course it takes more than a bit of historical research to
change a legal doctrine of almost a century's standing. The twen-
tieth-century erosion of Swift, and its dramatic demise in Erie,
reflected numerous, more powerful strands of economic, social,
and jurisprudential policy, so much so that Erie was little more
than a piece of flotsam on the tide of history. The oldest of these
strands was hostility to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, ex-
tending back to the furor aroused by Chisholm v. Georgia
(1793),106 resulting in ratification of the eleventh amendment, the
only amendment dealing with the jurisdiction of federal courts.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, this hostility focused
on section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,107 reflecting state an-
tagonism to doctrinal developments that threatened local auton-
omy (including the Kentucky resentments noted earlier.) 108 In the
1890s, this hostility continued unabated, but its target became di-
versity, rather than federal-question, jurisdiction. This derived
partly from a generalized public resentment at the influence of
substantive due process doctrines in such important decisions as
the Income Tax Cases of 1895109 and Lochner v. New York
(1905).110 In a more narrow sense, the old sectional hostility of
West and South against eastern economic interests focused on di-
versity jurisdiction. Large corporations and eastern investors or
creditors, through their attorneys, regarded diversity jurisdiction
as almost a panacea that enabled them to evade or thwart state
social and economic policies that favored Populist, Progressive,
and Reformist programs in the western and southern states. Chief
Justice William Howard Taft spoke for these eastern interests:
''no single element in our governmental system has done so much
105. Warren, New Light on the Judiciary Act of 1789, 36 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
106. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
107. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.
108. Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REv. 1.
161-89 (1913); Wiecek, The 'Imperial Judiciary' in Historical Perspective, YEARBOOK
1984 OF THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 61-89.
109. Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) and 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
110. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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to secure capital for the legitimate development of enterprises
throughout the West and South as the existence of federal courts
there, with a jurisdiction to hear diverse citizenship cases." '
The notorious hostility of federal judges to labor organizations,
as well as their often conservative social, political, and ideological
orientation, produced several notable congressional initiatives to
trim federal jurisdiction, including the prohibition of labor injunc-
tions in the Clayton Act of 1913,112 the provisions restricting labor
injunctions and prohibiting enforcement of yellow-dog contracts in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,113 the Johnson Act of 1934
forbidding injunctions against rate-setting orders made by state
public utilities commissions, a14 and the Tax Injunction Act of
1937.115 While these jurisdiction-limiting measures were counter-
balanced by other statutes of the period that had the effect of ex-
panding the power and jurisdiction of federal courts, 116 the Ameri-
can political process was sending a distinct message of resistance
to judicial activism.
Western insurgent senators, led by Nebraska Republican
George W. Norris, California Republican Hiram Johnson, and
Montana Democrat Thomas J. Walsh, introduced bills to strip
federal courts of diversity jurisdiction.117 These opponents stressed
a series of evils that had developed under the sheltering wing of
Swift: forum shopping, inconsistency of the substantive law within
the same jurisdiction, the power of large corporations to harass
individual litigants by removal to federal courts, business hostility
to court systems staffed by an elective judiciary who reflected the
political sentiments dominant in a state, and the ability of corpo-
rations and other economic interests to evade or gut state regula-
tory policy. Such complaints struck sympathetic chords among re-
form-minded heirs of the Progressive tradition. The Taft Court of
the 1920s had handed down several prominently reactionary deci-
sions, among them Truax v. Corrigan (1921),118 Bailey v. Drexel
111. Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Justice in the
Federal Courts, 45 REP. AM. B.A. 250, 259 (1922). See also Parker, Federal Jurisdiction,
18 AM. B. A. J. 433-39, 479 (1932).
112. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 730, 738.
113. Tax Injunction Act of 1937, ch. 726, 50 Stat. 738.
114. Johnson Act of 1934, ch. 283, 48 Stat. 775.
115. Norris-Laguardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, §§ 3, 4, 47 Stat. 70.
116. See, e.g., the Judiciary Act of 1915, ch. 22, 38 Stat. 805; the "Judges Bill" of
1925, the Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936; the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch.
651, 48 Stat. 1064; and the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955.
117. Noted briefly in T. FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE supra note 90, at 109,
177.
118. 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (voiding state statute prohibiting issuance of injunctions
against picketing in labor disputes.)
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Furniture (1922),11', Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923)120 and
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations (1923).121 To
Progressives, the Taxicab Case of 1928 seemed to ensconce fed-
eral courts in their role of providing a refuge from state laws.
Thus Erie Railroad v. Tompkins was a decision in which the
result was virtually determined by historical forces. Edward A.
Purcell, Jr. maintains in a forthcoming study of Erie that Justice
Brandeis, writing for the majority, was determined to realize Pro-
gressive ideals by removing the jurisdictional basis for federal
courts' anti-reform activism. Brandeis' opinion for the majority re-
alized his "localist" ideals. Early in his career, he formulated his
localist vision thus: "Local customs, traditions and the peculiar
habits of mind of its [Massachusetts'] people, have resulted in a
spirit which is its own. This is manifested partly in its statutes but
even more in what may be termed its common law."' 22
In one of his most eloquent dissents, he developed the theme:
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a sin-
gle courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labo-
ratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country. This Court has power to prevent
an experiment [as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause] .... But in the exercise of this high power,
we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into
legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we
must let our minds be bold.'
He insisted that "the present tendency towards centralization
must be arrested, if we are to attain the American ideals, and that
for it must be substituted intense development of life through ac-
tivities in the several states and localities."' 24
His Erie opinion was divided into three principal sections, each
of them exploring a different historical avenue but all of them
pointing to the destruction of Swift and the body of federal law
that had grown up under its authority. In his first part, he
sketched the criticisms of Swift's understanding of the Rules of
Decision Act, culminating in Warren's 1923 article and the
cloudburst of criticism that fell on the Taxicab Cases. In his see-
119. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (voiding federal tax on products of child labor).
120. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down state minimum wage law for women).
121. 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (restricting categories of business affected with a public
interest).
122. Brandeis to Charles W. Eliot, 25 April 1893, in LETTERS OF Louis D. BRAN-
DEIS: VOLUME 1 (1870-1907): URBAN REFORMER 113-116 at 114 (M. Urofsky and D. Levy
eds. 1971).
123. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting).
124. Quoted in T. FREYER HARMONY AND DISSONANCE, supra note 90, at 120.
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ond part, he surveyed recent complaints against the consequences
of Swift, emphasizing forum shopping and discrimination by non-
citizens against citizens of a state. Finally, in his third part, he
reached the extraordinary and unique conclusion that the ruling in
Swift was unconstitutional-the only time in its history that the
Court has so held.
Brandeis was no enemy of a federal common law as such. On
the same day that he handed down the Erie opinion, he spoke for
the Court in the Hinderlider case125 in holding that "whether the
water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the
two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which
neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be con-
clusive." Thus he was not trying to destroy the narrow conse-
quences of Swift, but rather its historical excrescences and, be-
yond that, entire lines of historical development, especially
substantive due process and the federal courts' antipathy to labor
organization. Seen in this light, Erie was the "procedural" com-
plement to the dismantling of substantive-due-process precedent
that began in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937).121 Brandeis
and the other members of the Erie majority did not "use" history
in the same sense that, say, Black did in Adamson, but the mo-
mentous result they reached was determined by decades-old his-
torical developments. The Erie result was ordained by Brandeis'
ideology, and that in turn was a product of his understanding of
America's past.
C. Individual Rights Cases
A third case study in the use of history by the Supreme Court
may be found in modern cases dealing with the rights of privacy
and intimate association, together with related rights such as indi-
vidual autonomy and self-realization. Throughout these cases in
the modern era, history-by-judicial-fiat dominated the develop-
ment of doctrine. But doctrines that live by the sword of con-
cocted history can perish in the same way, and the current vulner-
ability of privacy and intimate association doctrine suggests that
while good history cannot secure a doctrine, unsupported history
can weaken it.
The doctrinal roots of modern privacy-autonomy-association
ideas trace back to the seminal thought of Brandeis, who virtually
invented the concept of a constitutionally-secured privacy right in
125. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938). On the general subject of a federal common law, see Field, Sources of Law: The
Scope of Federal Common Law, 98 HARV. L. Rav. 881 (1986).
126. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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a 1890 law review article. 127 Once on the Court, he attempted to
ground such a right in the Constitution through a reinterpretation
of the Framers' intent. In Olmstead v. United States (1928),28
he insisted that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was the protec-
tion of individual privacy and dignity: "the makers of our
Constitution . . .conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men." The right to be let alone was kin to
a related concept that Brandeis concurrently expressed, something
that today we would call self-actualization. In his Whitney con-
currence, Brandeis maintained that "those who won our indepen-
dence believed that the final end of the State was to make men
free to develop their faculties ... .
Brandeis was joined in the exploration and development of this
right by a most unlikely colleague, James C. McReynolds,1 30 who
articulated kindred rights of intimate association and self-realiza-
tion in the only substantive due process cases of the old era that
have survived 1937. In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), a decision
striking down a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of any
language but English in the schools of the state, McReynolds
identified a fourteenth amendment right of individuals "to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren, to worship God according to the dictates of their own con-
science, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men."131 (McReynolds' approach was not unusual in his era.
All rights that we subsume today under the rubric "civil liberties"
were thought of in the 1920s as protected by the due process
clauses, not primarily the first amendment.) Two years later, he
spoke for a unanimous Court in voiding an Oregon statute requir-
ing all children to be educated in public schools: "The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog-
nize and prepare him for additional obligations. '"132
While Brandeis was attempting to establish a constitutionally
127. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). The
right of privacy identified here demonstrates the interesting phenomenon of the passage of
an idea from private law (torts) to public law.
128. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
129. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
130. The association of Brandeis and McReynolds in anything, much less the protec-
tion of civil liberties, is almost unimaginable, given McReynolds' flagrant and coarse anti-
Semitism, which often found expression in deliberate snubs of Brandeis.
131. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Holmes dissented, in keeping with his belief that a
legislature should be free to enact folly into law if it wished to do so.
132. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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recognized right of privacy and McReynolds was providing a sub-
stantive due process grounding for it, Justices Holmes and Car-
dozo were laying the foundation for a third doctrinal tradition
that would blend with the former two. They both sought in their
differing ways to resolve an old conundrum, which, stated in terms
of current constitutional controversy, is this: if a judge believes
that the text of the Constitution and the available evidence of the
Framers' intent are insufficient to the resolution of a problem,
where does he turn for guidance in formulating a rule that will
solve the problem within some conception of a rule of law? Both
men rejected the notion propounded by Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney in the Dred Scott Case that the meaning of the Constitu-
tion is immutable.133 (Most commentators had assumed that this
idea was buried with Taney in the Civil War. It has been ex-
humed, however, by some judges and academics in recent
times).'3 They therefore had to locate a source of values outside
the text that might serve as a rule of interpretation for judges.
Holmes found it in the historical experience of the American peo-
ple. He began with a rejection of formalism:
[t]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formu-
las having their essence in their form; they are organic living
institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is
vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the
words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the
line of their growth. 135
He amplified on this theme later:
When we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that
they have called into life a being the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost
their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they cre-
ated a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said
a hundred years ago. 131
Justice Cardozo, Holmes' successor on the Court, developed the
idea further in what was to be his most influential opinion written
for the United States Supreme Court, Palko v. Connecticut
133. Scott v. Sandford, 19 U.S. (19 How.) 393, (1857). ("[W]hile [the Constitution]
remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adop-
tion. It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning.") Id. at 426.
134. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976);
R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 24
(1985).
135. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
136. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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(1937) .11 Drawing upon his own formulation in an earlier case, 13
he wrote of "a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."" 9
From this historical notion of principles of justice derived from the
traditions of the American people, Cardozo, in almost poetic lan-
guage, referred to "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions," 4
principles "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" and
so essential "that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed."1 41
From this tradition, Frankfurter (who was Cardozo's successor
on the Court), drew inspiration for his formulation of the principle
of due process in the Adamson case: "those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples.' 42 Frankfurter insisted that he was merely interpreting
"the political and legal history of the concept of due process," and
he rejected the possibility of any sort of formulaic approach:
"these standards of justice are not authoritatively formulated any-
where as though they were prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia. 43
The Black-Frankfurter debate mirrored a juridical conflict that
went back to the earliest years of the republic, and that was ex-
plicitly argued out between Justices Samuel Chase and James Ire-
dell in the 1798 case of Calder v. Bull. 4 4 Chase there contended
for supra-textual "vital principles in our free Republican govern-
ments." Rejecting this "natural law" formulation, Iredell insisted
that the Supreme Court "cannot pronounce [a statute] to be void,
merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles
of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no
fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon
the subject . . . 411 To comparable objections raised by Black a
century-and-a-half later, Frankfurter responded (as Chase had
not):
The faculties of the Due Process Clause may be indefinite and
vague, but the mode of ascertainment is not self-willed [by thejudges]. In each case "due process of law" requires an evalua-
tion based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of sci-
ence, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on
137. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
138. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
139. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
140. Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
141. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326.
142. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 68.
144. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
145. Id. at 399.
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the detached consideration of conflicting claims, on a judgment
not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the
needs both of continuity and change in a progressive society. 1 4
The Black-Frankfurter debate dragged on inconclusively even
beyond Frankfurter's retirement and death, with Justice John M.
Harlan carrying on the tradition espoused by Frankfurter of bal-
ancing and a reliance on principles developed and derived from
the historical experience of the American people.147 This set the
stage for the modern conflict on the Court, now almost a quarter-
century old, over the existence of rights of intimate association.
Harlan returned to the Holmes-Cardozo-Frankfurter formulations
in his dissent in one of the earliest of the birth-control cases, Poe
v. Ullman (1961).148 Defending a right of marital privacy, Harlan
drew on the Chase formulas of Calder to affirm the role of judges
in assessing a balance between the rights of individual liberty and
the power of the state to regulate, a "balance struck by this coun-
try, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
The tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which rad-
ically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision
which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound." The
anomalous problem of state inhibitions on birth control, plus the
Harlan invitation to identify historically-defined traditions, in-
duced Justices William 0. Douglas and Arthur J. Goldberg to
turn to the ninth amendment four years later to affirm the value
of intimate association.
In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 9 where the Supreme Court
finally came to grips with the substantive issues presented by
birth-control regulation, the ninth amendment made its sudden,
dramatic debut in constitutional discourse. While this forgotten
amendment was cited by Justice Douglas in his majority opinion
as one of six different textual sources proving the existence of "a
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights,"15 it was Justice
Goldberg, concurring, who grounded the privacy right historically,
as Harlan had insisted it must be. Goldberg read the amendment
as indicating that "the Framers believed that there are additional
fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement,
146. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
147. See, e.g., the opposing positions of Harlan, J., writing for the majority, and
Blackmun, J., writing a dissent in which Black joined, in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971).
148. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
149. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
150. Id. at 486. The other sources are the first, third, fourth (search-and-seizure),
fifth (self-incrimination), and fourteenth (due process) amendments.
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which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically men-
tioned in the first eight constitutional amendments."151 Like
Holmes, Cardozo, and Frankfurter before him, Goldberg relied on
the Palko standards of the historical traditions of the American
people as validation for this newly-minted right.
The right of privacy and intimate association thus identified in
Griswold soon demonstrated its protean character. It quickly ex-
panded to individuals as well to as married couples; 52 and to
rights of family association, a right defined by Justice Lewis Pow-
ell in Moore v. East Cleveland (1977)153 as "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." Moore was remarkable for its dia-
logue between the majority, speaking through Justice Powell, and
Justice Byron White in dissent on the meaning and role of history
in Supreme Court adjudication. Powell used history in two ways:
to discriminate between discredited versions of substantive due
process such as that represented by Lochner,'5 4 and the valid mod-
ern sort (e.g., Griswold); and in the form of social history, to
demonstrate the continued vitality of the extended family. White
in dissent warned the majority that it was coming close to
Lochnerizing, insisting that the Palko tradition did not encompass
questions of family composition. "What the deeply rooted tradi-
tions of the country are is arguable; which of them deserves the
protection of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable. 155
To this Powell replied that "an approach grounded in history im-
poses limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any
based on the abstract formula taken from Palko."' 56
But of course the foci of the modern substantive due process
rights of privacy and association are the abortion cases, the prog-
eny of Roe v. Wade (1973). aS  In Roe, Justice Harry Blackmun
for the majority reaffirmed the Palko tradition as the source of
ninth and fourteenth amendment protected rights of privacy from
state intrusion on decisions affecting the most intimate relation-
ships of human existence, above all, maternity. Throughout his
opinion, Blackmun resorted to brief historical arguments to estab-
lish such elements of his position as the legal non-personhood of
fetuses and the development of theological and philosophical doc-
trines concerning abortion and human personality. Countering
this, Justice Rehnquist in dissent made a similar use of history to
151. Id. at 488.
152. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
153. 431 U.S. at 503.
154. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
155. 431 U.S. at 549.
156. Id. at 504 n.12.
157. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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demonstrate that abortion was not a right historically located in
the Palko tradition, from which he drew the conclusion that the
Court was Lochnerizing, rendering a decision that "partakes more
of judicial legislation than it does of a determination of the intent
of the drafters of the fourteenth amendment."' 158
Justice Harlan's prediction in Poe v. Ullman is being validated
by the subsequent course of development of the privacy/intimate
association doctrine. Roe itself, controversial from the day it was
announced,65 has come under massive attack as has no other sin-
gle decision since Dred Scott. The political arm of this attack has
thus far not succeeded in overturning the decision by constitu-
tional amendment or legislation, but the critique of Justice Black-
mun's reasoning coming from within the Court itself'60 has eroded
its intellectual foundations. An indication of how far those foun-
dations have been undercut was Justice White's terse majority
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986),61 the Georgia sodomy
case. White and Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred, and
went out of their way to demonstrate that the traditions of the
nation (White) or western civilization (Burger) are hostile to ho-
mosexual activity. It was futile for the minority, speaking through
Justice Blackmun, to argue that the four members of the courtjoining White's opinion had missed the point of what the case was
about; after Bowers, a generalized right of sexual intimacy stands
outside the historically-defined parameters of the fourteenth
amendment's scope.
Moreover, Bowers is not the end of the bad news for those who
would find in history a validation of the rights of privacy and inti-
mate association (whatever may be the fate of Roe after Justice
Powell's retirement). All constitutional doctrine is a double-edged
sword or, to vary the historical metaphor from military to naval,
potentially a loose cannon. Doctrine can be used to undercut as
well as to affirm a right, and that potential has always existed in
the privacy/association/autonomy area. Herbert Wechsler antici-
pated this development in his 1959 Holmes lectures, reprinted as
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law..' 2 Criticizing
the Brown Court for, he claimed, arbitrarily preferring the right
158. Id. at 174.
159. See, e.g., for critical contemporary commentary, Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159-186 (1973).
160. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
161. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
162. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAV. L. REV.
1 (1959). Reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1963).
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of blacks to associate with whites by attending desegregated
schools, Wechsler argued that this deprived whites of their right
to choose their associations. Conceivably, such a notion might be
put to unimaginable uses by conservative jurists hostile to the
egalitarian and anti-discrimination ideals defended by the Warren
and Burger Courts. In 1963, then-Professor Robert Bork opposed
what was to become the Civil Rights Act of 1964,163 on the
grounds that it would deprive a segregationist minority of freedom
(to segregate). He considered a "coerced scale of preferences...
rooted in a moral order"-i.e., hostility to discrimination-a value
subordinate to individual liberty. 6 4
The Court did in fact find an associational right to exclude out-
siders powerful enough to receive fourteenth amendment protec-
tion in Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984),165 at least where
the group was small, intimate, selective, non-commercial, and a
vehicle for transmitting values. Families are the modal type of
such groups; religious enterprises are another. 6' While no one
would quarrel with the idea that families must be permitted to
"discriminate," if that is the word, by refusing to admit outsiders,
constitutional doctrines have a way of expanding beyond the
boundaries of their reasonable limits and extending to situations
not foreseen when they were formulated. Who can tell what in-
roads may be gouged out of the scope of equal protection by the
concession of a right to exclude?
III. THE HISTORICAL APPROACH IN DEALING WITH THE
RIGHTS OF BLACK AMERICANS
In contrast to the disparate directions that judicial uses of his-
tory have taken in recent times, the Court's resort to history in
nineteenth century cases dealing with the rights of black people
tended uniformly to one general consequence: The degradation of
blacks in slavery, crypto-servitude, and nominal freedom. In com-
pany with the rest of white American society, the Supreme Court
diminished constitutional and legal securities for the rights of
blacks, abetting legal, extra-legal, and illegal movements to
subordinate them. Throughout this process, the abuse of history
was an instrument in devaluing the constitutional position of
blacks.
In retrospect, it appears as if the Court could not touch a
163. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
164. Bork, Civil Rights - A Challenge, NEw REPUBLIC 20 (Aug. 31, 1963).
165. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
166. Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos,
107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
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landmark case before 1900 that involved the rights of blacks with-
out distorting history. Justice Story began the tradition in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania (1842)167 with a piece of egregious history-by-judi-
cial-fiat that was meant to sustain his holding that the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793168 was constitutional:
Historically, it is well known that the object of [the fugitive
slave] clause 169 was to secure to the citizens of the slaveholding
States the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves,
as property, in every State in the Union .... [The clause] was
so vital to the preservation of their domestic interests and insti-
tutions, that it cannot be doubted that it constituted a funda-
mental article, without the adoption of which the Union could
not have been formed .... L70
Story was adept at using history to refashion or create law,'17 1 but
here his historical ipse dixit was grossly erroneous. A strong argu-
ment could be made that the three-fifths and slave importation
clauses were the South's price for union at the Philadelphia Con-
vention, 7 2 but the fugitive slave clause was a last-minute after-
thought, opportunistically secured by the South Carolina dele-
gates late in the convention.'7 3
Bad as Story's history was, Chief Justice Taney's was worse.
Story's error was probably inadvertent, and at worst wishful
thinking; Taney's several misstatements displayed what the mod-
ern libel test labels "actual malice-that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."' 74 His Dred Scott opinion rested on three gross misstate-
ments of historical fact; two of these served to suppress blacks into
a degraded status outside constitutional protection; the third sup-
ported Taney's strained and implausible attempt to deny Congress
power to regulate the territories and admit new states. It was the
dictum was that the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was unconsti-
tutional because Congress lacked power to exclude slavery from
the territories.' 5
167. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
168. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
169. U.S. CONST., art IV, § 2, cl. 3.
170. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611 (1842).
171. See, e.g., Story's opinion in De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (C.C.D.Mass.)
(No. 3776).
172. Such an argument was made in W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 65-76 (1977).
173. P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 26-
27 (1981); W. WIECEK, supra note 172, at 79.
174. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
175. See generally two critiques of Taney's reasoning in Dred Scott: D.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 335-88 (1978); H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 172-90 (1982).
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Taney had to demonstrate that blacks could not be "Citizens"
for diversity purposes176 in order to deny them access to federal
courts in freedom suits. (To digress on this important point for a
moment: one of the several reasons why Taney believed it essen-
tial to establish this point was that if slaves were permitted access
to federal courts under diversity, they could not be denied jury
trial under the seventh amendment: freedom suits were usually
fictive assault and battery or false imprisonment litigation, and
therefore "[S]uits at common law" and the amount in controversy
would almost always exceed the constitutionally-specified mini-
mum of "twenty dollars," because the average price of a male
slave in 1850 between the ages of one and seventy years old was
well over fifty dollars.7 7 This in turn would override the denial of
jury trial in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,178 and cast a shadow
on the constitutionality of that statute. Scott's counsel at trial
were aware of this possibility, 7 9 though abolitionists invariably
missed its astonishing implications. By flawed reasoning, Taney
attempted to demonstrate that blacks could not be "Citizens" for
Article III purposes because they were not "Citizens" for Article
IV180 purposes. To establish this point, he inferred the Framers'
intent from public opinion in 1787: Blacks then "had for more
than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in so-
cial or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect. ,.181 Taney's
assertion was doubly wrong: Blacks were not so debased in the
1780s s2 and their legal status in the northern states had improved
considerably in the years since.183 But the false present reality he
created by manipulation of history was an integral part of his con-
stitutional vision.
Taney's second use of history was of a piece with the first. Usu-
ally law-office history has to circumvent precedent. But for Taney,
the precedent with which he had to work, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, could not be dealt with in such a fashion; rather, it had
to be explained away. If he had been addressing only a slave state
176. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
177. R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERI-
CAN NEGRO SLAVERY 76, fig. 18 (1974).
178. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
179. Roswell M. Field to Montgomery Blair, 7 January 1855, typescript transcript of
letter in Dred Scott Collection, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.
180. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
181. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 426 (1856).
182. D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 175, at 349.
183. Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the
Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986).
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audience, that would have been no problem because the public law
of the slave states since Independence had construed blacks to be
outside the scope of the phrase "all men are created equal."18 But
his opinion was addressed principally to the people of the free
states, and so he had to educate his audience about how to read
the Declaration:
It is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were
not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people
who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as
understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the
distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence
would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the
principles they asserted . . .. 5
If we today are to make sense of what Taney was saying here,
we must remember that context is all important. His idea, though
a concocted recreation of the past, made sense within the legal
system in which slave state jurists operated. The problem posed by
Taney's words just quoted is that they constituted part of his ef-
fort to impose the legal order of the slave states on the free states.
The slave-state legal order was premised on what has come to be
called in modern times the "dual state." '186 As described by Judith
Shklar,187 such a legal order has:
a perfectly fair and principled private law system, and also a
harsh, erratic criminal control system, but it is a "dual State"
because some of its population is simply declared to be subhu-
man, and a public danger, and as such excluded from the legal
order entirely . . . . Such was the government of the United
States until the Civil War and in some ways thereafter. Such
also was Nazi Germany and such is South Africa today.
The southern legal order explicitly adopted dual-state premises(without using the terminology, of course) in the landmark 1829
case of State v. Mann.188 The peculiar tensions that distinguished
it derived from its contorted efforts to exclude blacks from it for
certain purposes and to include them for others.'89 All this was
obvious to a southern attorney, but Taney correctly perceived that
184. For Virginia, to cite a typical example, see the discussion in A. HOWARD, 1,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 64 (1974).
185. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 410 (1856).
186. This concept was first propounded, to my knowledge, by E. FRAENKEL, THE
DUAL STATE, (E.A. Shils trans. 1941) (analysis of the legal order of the Third Reich).
187. J. SHKLAR, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RULE OF LAW, A. HUTCHINSON AND
P. MONAHAN, EDS., THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 2 (1987). Her characteriza-
tion differs substantively, in my opinion, from Fraenkel's dichotomy between what he
called the "Prerogative State" and the "Normative State." For present purposes, I find her
description more pertinent to American conditions.
188. 2 Dev. 263 (N.C. 1829).
189. Cf. M. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERA-
TIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981).
1988]
31
Wiecek: Clio As Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
the North needed to be schooled on the matter.
Taney's third use of history was designed to deny Congress
power to exclude slavery from the territories. (This in turn was a
necessary prelude to imposing the premises of John C. Calhoun's
constitutional theory on the American constitutional system,
under which the federal government was obliged to protect slavery
everywhere, including the territories.) Here Taney confronted not
only an embarrassing precedent, American Insurance Co. v.
Canter,190 which implied plenary congressional power over the ter-
ritories, but also the text of the Constitution itself, which in Arti-
cle IV, section 3 provided that "[the Congress shall have Power
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respect-
ing the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States." His solution was historical, ingenious and implausible.
Law office history as a precedent-busting device was called for,
and Taney produced it, declaring on the strength of nothing more
than an ipse dixit that the territories clause was irrelevant be-
cause it applied only to territories owned by the federal govern-
ment in 1787 and not to after-acquired lands. (It goes without
saying that there was no historical basis for such a reading.)
With the Territories Clause thus disposed of, Taney then laid a
foundation for the rest of his opinion on the New States Clause of
Article IV, section 3.191 He went on to hold that the clause im-
plied that Congress could not impose conditions on the admission
of new states, such as a prohibition of slavery, because that would
deny such a state equality of status with other states. This busted
two precedents, the Northwest Ordinance (which had been reaf-
firmed by statute by the First Congress1 2-a fact that a lesser
jurist than Taney might have taken to be conclusive on the consti-
tutionality of congressional power to exclude slavery) and Permoli
v. New Orleans (1845), 93 holding that Congress could impose
conditions on admission of new states. Bad history was not the
worst vice of Dred Scott, but it augmented Taney's a priori pro-
slavery positions so powerfully that nothing less than a constitu-
tional amendment could undo the baneful effects of Taney's tor-
tured reasoning.
Even if we dismiss Dred Scott as a singular opinion, unique in
its malevolent effects, judicial history served blacks badly in later
landmark nineteenth-century precedents. The Slaughterhouse
190. 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511 (1828).
191. U.S. CoNsT., art. IV, § 3, cl. 1: "New States may be admitted by the Congress
into this Union; ... "
192. Act of August 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
193. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
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Cases' of 1873 were a tour de force of historical reasoning, not
only in Jfistice Samuel F. Miller's majority opinion, but in the
dissents of Justices Stephen J. Field and Joseph P. Bradley as
well.
Justice Miller used historical reasoning of various kinds to es-
tablish no less than five major points of his opinion. First, he con-
firmed the doctrine of the police power, a constitutional concept of
surprisingly recent origin, dating from Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw's 1851 opinion in Commonwealth v. Alger. 9 5 He actually
used the term-itself an innovation-and declared that it "has
been, up to the present period in the constitutional history of this
country, always conceded to belong to the States."' 196 This, in
turn, provided a doctrinal basis for the Court's ratification of state
regulatory power several years later in Munn v. Illinois,"9 7 and
later for the Court's holding in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).198
Miller next turned to what he considered the key to the mean-
ing of the new amendments to the Constitution: recent history.
"The history of the times . . . fresh within the memory of us all"
disclosed that "the one pervading purpose" of the amendments
was "the freedom of the slave race ... and the protection of the
newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppression of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him."' 99 At first
glance, this emphasis seemed to augur well for the freed people,
suggesting an attitude among federal judges that would construe
the amendments liberally to attain the objectives so sweepingly
stated. Like Marshall before him, Miller seemed to be using this
benign form of history-by-judicial-fiat, contemporary history as
remembered by a participant, to justify an expansion of federal
power.
But unlike Marshall, Miller was hobbled by a timid conserva-
tism when confronted with revolutionary change. He could not
bring himself to accept the sweeping implications of the amend-
ments, which "would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon
all legislation of the States." When the consequences of a liberal
construction of federal power "are so serious, so far-reaching and
pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of
our institutions" and when the proferred interpretation "radically
194. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
195. 7 Cush. 61 Mass. 53.
196. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 62 (1873).
197. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). Cf. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and
the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY (vol. V
of PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY) 329-402 (D. Fleming and B. Bailyn, eds., 1971).
198. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
199. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 71 (1873).
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changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal
governments to each other," 200 Miller balked. His reluctant atti-
tude would have the most far-reaching doctrinal consequences for
three of the four substantive rights conferred by section one of the
fourteenth amendment, and would shunt the thirteenth amend-
ment to the sidelines as a guarantor of the rights of blacks.
Continuing with the same deceptive process of a broad reading
leading to a narrow result, Miller construed the privileges and im-
munities clauses of article IV and the fourteenth amendment in
the comprehensive sense originally outlined by Justice Bushrod
Washington in his 1823 Circuit Court opinion, Corfield v. Cory-
ell.20 1 But he immediately qualified this promising beginning by
drawing a distinction between federal and state privileges, holding
that only the former were protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Miller enumerated five federal privileges, of which only two might
be of any relevance to most black people: habeas corpus and the
rights of assembly and petition. For all others within Washing-
ton's description ("protection by government ... the right to ac-
quire and possess property of every kind," etc.) blacks were remit-
ted to the states, both for the substantive definition of the content
of the rights, and for the protection of those rights. At the time
Miller wrote, negrophobic Redeemer governments had swept to
power in most of the southern states, and would take over the rest
before the end of the decade. Hence his assurances had an omi-
nously hollow ring to blacks.
Only the privileges-and-immunities part of Miller's reasoning
has survived doctrinally into our own times. Every other aspect of
his opinion has been repudiated. As Justice William H. Moody
observed in 1908, "criticism of this case has never entirely ceased,
nor has it ever received universal assent by members of this
Court."20 2 The Court expressed second thoughts about the privi-
leges-and-immunities clause holding only once, in 1935,20 and
that opinion did not long withstand Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's
privately-expressed criticism that it treated principles "not better
than an excursion ticket, good for this day and trip only. '204 The
case was overruled only five years later,205 restoring Miller's read-
ing of the privileges and immunities clause, which remains domi-
nant today.
200. Id. at 78.
201. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)(No. 3230).
202. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96 (1908).
203. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
204. Stone to Felix Frankfurter, February 17, 1936, quoted in A. MAsON, THE SU-
PREME COURT: VEHICLE OF REVEALED TRUTH OR POWER GROUP, 1930-1937 41 (1953).
205. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
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The same conservative approach guided Miller's treatment of
the due process and equal protection clauses. Alluding unspecifi-
cally to both federal and state precedents construing the due pro-
cess and law-of-the-land clauses of the federal and state constitu-
tions, he wrote that "under no construction of that provision that
we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible," could the
Louisiana monopoly deprive the aggrieved butchers of due pro-
cess.20 6 That statement was, to say the least, a curious bit of his-
tory-by-fiat. To make it, Miller had to shut his eyes to the consid-
erable body of precedent in the state courts linking the clauses to
higher-law doctrines,207 as well as to three significant United
States Supreme Court opinions: Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co. (1856),210 in which Justice Benjamin
R. Curtis anticipated postbellum substantive due process doctrinal
developments; Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott, in
which he explicitly (though briefly and offhandedly) articulated
the doctrine; 09 and Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase's more exten-
sive use of the doctrine in the first Legal Tender Case (1870).21a
Miller's approach to the equal protection clause was different.
Referring once again to his general reading of the history of the
War and its immediate aftermath he concluded that "we do not
see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main features
of the general [federal] system." '' Thus he confined the scope of
equal protection to blacks: "we doubt very much whether any ac-
tion of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the
negroes as a class, or an account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision."2" 2 This proved to be
an empty boon to blacks, for with only rare and occasional excep-
tions,2 13 the equal protection clause slipped off into a profoundly
dormant condition for eighty years.
The future belonged to the dissenters, Justices Field and Brad-
ley, who also used history, not to confine the federal system in
familiar molds as Miller had done, but to explode doctrinal con-
fines and create a new body of law-substantive due process and
liberty of contract-for the new age. Field relied on the four-
206. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 81 (1873).
207. See Wynehamer v. New York, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
208. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
209. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 450 (1857).
210. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
211. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 82 (1873).
212. Id. at 81.
213. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (equal protection clause vio-
lated by invidious administration of municipal ordinance.) But for most of the clause's
history, its comatose state justified Justice Holmes' sneering dismissal as "the usual last
resort of constitutional arguments": Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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teenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause, but trans-
formed its meaning with the aid of history. He construed it in
terms of Judge Washington's sweeping dicta in Corfield, as well
as of higher-law concepts enunciated by Justice Samuel Chase in
Calder v. Bull (1798).214 He emphasized that this was the con-
struction favored by the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of
1866,21 which the fourteenth amendment was intended in part to
ratify. Then, in a brilliant fusion of historically heterogeneous
ideas, he tied the Cornfield/Calder vision of natural rights with
the centuries-old common law antipathy to monopoly privilege:
"this equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and
partial enactaments, in the lawful pursuits of life, throughout the
whole country, is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the
United States. 216
While Field's performance was intellectually impressive, it was
Bradley who identified the more powerful juridical concept. His
argument was equally historical, beginning with the old idea, es-
tablished in debates on the reception of the common law in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, that "the people of
this country brought with them to its shores the rights of English-
men," including the law-of-the-land provision of Magna Carta's
celebrated chapter thirty-nine.217 From thence, he leapt to a sub-
stantive conception of due process: "Life, liberty, and property...
are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due
process of law."218 Included within this broad concept was the em-
bryonic idea of liberty of contract: A law inhibiting persons from
pursuing a legal trade "does deprive them of liberty as well as
property, without due process of law ... their occupation is their
property. ' 219 Bradley concluded his dissent with a historical inter-
pretation that transformed the fourteenth amendment, aban-
doning the freed people and shifting its protection to economic
interests:
It is futile to argue that none but persons of the African race are
intended to be benefited by this amendment. They may have
been the primary cause of the amendment, but its language is
general, embracing all citizens.... The mischief to be remedied
was not merely slavery and its incidents and consequences; but
that spirit of insubordination and disloyalty to the National gov-
ernment which had troubled the country for so many years in
214. 3 U.S. (3. DalI.) 386 (1798) (Chase, J., seriatim opinion).
215. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173.
216. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 109-10.
217. Id. at 114.
218. Id. at 116.
219. Id. at 122.
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some of the States. 220
In this passage, Bradley used history-by-fiat to reinterpret the ori-
gins of section one of the fourteenth amendment. He subsumed
into Republican concern for the fate of blacks and their hostility
to state sovereignty ideas a more contemporary conservative hos-
tility to debt repudiation, reflected first in Gelpcke and kindred
cases, and then in judicial antagonism to what the southern states
euphemistically termed "readjustment": The process of debt repu-
diation by the Democratic "Redeemer" regimes coming to power
after the ouster of Republican governments in the southern states.
The Slaughterhouse majority had effectively abandoned blacks
as an object of special constitutional concern, relegating them to
the hollow security of state protection for their rights. At the same
time, the dissents created a new paradigm of law, one that was to
dominate American law for the next two generations. Both these
momentous developments were achieved by historical reasoning;
indeed, the results on both sides would have been insupportable
without some form of historical justification, specious or inventive
as it may have been.
History similarly informed both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in the next major case affecting the rights of black peo-
ple, the Civil Rights Cases (1883) .221 For a decade after
Slaughterhouse, all three branches of the federal government re-
ceded from their post-war commitment to protecting the rights of
former slaves. Thus when the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875222 was contested in this case, it came as little surprise
that the statute was overturned. What is striking a century later,
however, is how historically-determined that result was.
Justice Bradley for the majority began with an interpretation of
congressional intent at the time of the enactment of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, holding that under the thirteenth amendment,
"[c]ongress did not assume.., to adjust what may be called the
social rights of men and races in the community; but only to de-
clare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to
the essence of citizenship. ' 23 He thus posited a fundamental dis-
tinction between the various legal rights specified in the 1866 Act
and the social relationships between the races. The former, he im-
plied, were subject to legal regulation of some sort; the latter were
not. (This distinction would bear its poisoned fruit thirteen years
later in Plessy.) Then, after concocting the state-action doctrine
220. Id. at 123.
221. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
222. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
223. 109 U.S. at 22.
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as an interpretation of the Framers' intent in ratifying the four-
teenth amendment, Bradley denied that Congress could reach pri-
vate racial discrimination under its thirteenth amendment powers
(the state-action doctrine standing as a barrier to use of the four-
teenth amendment.) The effect of these doctrines was that the
public accommodations section of the 1875 Civil Rights Act was
held unconstitutional.
Bradley concluded with a rhetorical flourish. Rebutting Justice
John M. Harlan in dissent, he denied that racial discrimination
constituted a "badge of slavery" that Congress could reach under
the legislative powers conferred by section two of the thirteenth
amendment. "When a man has emerged from slavery," he in-
toned, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation
when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the
special favorite of the laws. 224 Bradley's restrictive reading of the
thirteenth amendment was rejected by the Court eighty-five years
later in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,225 where Justice Potter Stew-
art held that racial discrimination, in the form of a refusal to sell
real property to persons on account of race, did constitute a badge
of slavery that Congress could prohibit under its thirteenth
amendment powers.
The first Justice John M. Harlan, dissenting in the Civil Rights
Cases,226 rejected Bradley's conclusion. Drawing on his own un-
usual personal experience-he had been a Kentucky slaveowner
yet an officer in the Kentucky Union forces during the War-he
insisted that in a slave society, universal race discrimination was
one of the "burdens and disabilities which constitute badges of
slavery. ' 22 7 In an idea vindicated in our own time,228 Harlan
maintained:
that since slavery was the moving or principal cause of the adop-
tion of [the Thirteenth] Amendment, and since that institution
rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in
bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and
protection against all discrimination against them, because of
their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of
other races. 229
Then, turning to the history of the common law, Harlan main-
224. Id. at 25.
225. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
226. By an historical irony, his grandson and namesake, the second Justice Harlan,
dissented in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., rejecting his grandfather's expansive reading of
congressional power under the thirteenth amendment.
227. 109 U.S. at 35. Accord Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421-430 (1960).
228. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
229. 109 U.S. at 36.
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tained that railroads are "public highways" and inns "quasi-pub-
lic" franchises, and as such subject to public regulatory power. "A
license from the public to establish a place of public amusement,
imports, in law, equality of right, at such places. . . ." He drew
from that conclusion that Congress under its thirteenth amend-
ment powers could prohibit discrimination in such places exercis-
ing "public or quasi public functions" because such discrimination
was a badge of slavery.2 30 This argument, adapted to suggest that
such quasi-public functions could be reached under congressional
power derived from section five of the fourteenth amendment, has
been rejected in our time.23 1
The first Harlan found himself on the losing side of historical
argumentation again in the decision that validated Jim Crow,
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).232 Justice Henry B. Brown's majority
opinion has been belabored so often that reviewing or condemning
its premises yet again would be supererogatory. But it is useful to
be reminded of how historical his approach was. He relied heavily
on Roberts v. Boston, 3 Lemuel Shaw's 1849 decision holding
that the Boston school board had authority to segregate the races
in public schools. Brown made much of the fact that Boston was a
center of abolitionist thought. The most recent student of Plessy
has concluded that Brown's "vision of social reality ...did not
lack substantial support in contemporary expert opinion; nor was
his history jarringly inaccurate."234 Brown's ideas were common-
place, at least among whites of the time. The history of segrega-
tion and discrimination in America blended smoothly with con-
temporary racist thought, both crude and learned, into an
integrated view of the place of blacks in America-and that place
was in the Jim Crow car.
Justice Harlan dissented again, largely plowing over ground he
had furrowed in the Civil Rights Cases. Speaking as a southerner
having the intimate acquaintance with southern mores and atti-
tudes that Justice Brown, a native of Massachusetts and lifelong
resident of the North, lacked, Harlan wrote that every one knows
that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so
much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by
blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches ". . . assigned
to white persons . . ." as a deliberate means of caste degrada-
230. 109 U.S. at 43.
231. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
232. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
233. 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1849).
234. C. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 198
(1987).
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tion.2 35 He predicted that Plessy would be in time as "pernicious"
as Dred Scott, and so indeed it has become. Even a lawyer as
unsympathetic to civil rights issues as United States Attorney
General Edwin Meese has endorsed Philip Kurland's judgment
condemning the two decisions together as "derelicts of constitu-
tional law." '2 36
The effect of the Court's landmark slavery and civil rights cases
of the nineteenth century was to ratify the actions of southern so-
ciety casting blacks into an obscure netherworld of quasi-freedom,
where they were legitimately subject to segregation and discrimi-
nation, deprived of the ballot and effective access to courts, kept
in economic subjugation as a landless peasantry and unskilled la-
bor pool, terrorized by illegal violence for which they could secure
no protection or redress. History served throughout as hand-
maiden to this effort, validating racial prejudice and blighting the
promise of the Reconstruction Amendments.
CONCLUSION
Every person will draw their own lessons from these historical
explorations, and I would not attempt to intrude with mine. But
an historian writing for lawyers may be permitted to comment on
some assumptions about the nature of history that non-historians
commonly make. For purposes of illustration, let me begin with
United States Attorney General Edwin Meese's call for "a Juris-
prudence of Original Intention." In pursuit of this, Meese has
promised that his department "will endeavor to resurrect the orig-
inal meaning of constitutional provisions." "It is our belief that
only 'the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified
by the nation' . . . provide[s] a solid foundation for adjudica-
tion. 237 This is obviously an historical enterprise, depending on
an understanding of history that Meese shares with other non-his-
torians. Let me identify their assumptions.
First, the non-historian assumes that historical facts are objec-
tively knowable, "out there," so to speak, and that they will dis-
close themselves to anyone who seeks diligently. The person hold-
ing this belief does not distinguish among historical fact,
inference, and interpretation. Facts speak for themselves, and,
when properly selected and arranged, provide the basis for a cor-
235. 163 U.S. at 552.
236. Speech of October 21, 1986, reported in N.Y. Times, October 23, 1986; the
quoted phrase appears in an excerpt of the speech reprinted in F. SCHAUER, 1987 SUPPLE-
MENT to GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2 (1987).
237. Speech to American Bar Association, July 9, 1985, reprinted in THE GREAT
DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 9-10 (Washington, n.d.).
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rect interpretation of the past. False interpretations come about
by an incomplete or distorted ordering of the facts. The "true"
past is the sum of historical facts honestly marshalled. David H.
Fischer describes this attitude thus: the historian "is supposed to
go a-wandering in the dark forest of the past, gathering facts like
nuts and berries, until he has enough to make a general truth.
Then he is to store up his general truths until he has the whole
truth. 2 38 Historical truth is therefore a function of facts. It is
found and evaluated on the basis of facts.
Second, the past-the actual, "real" past, out there--does not
change. "A fact is a fact," the common expression has it. The
past, as the totality of facts, is forever set by its very pastness. It
cannot be changed. It can, of course, be interpreted or narrated
falsely, but the real past exists independently of the way it is
interpreted.
Third, the application of the past to the present is essentially a
matter of getting the facts straight. The principal danger in ac-
complishing this is that our arrangement of facts might be dis-
torted, either because of the incompleteness of our collection, or
because the arrangement is passed through the distorting filter of
our ideology, which skews an arrangement that would otherwise
speak for itself if organized on some elementary principle such as
chronological sequence.
This assumption is to history what "mechanical jurisprudence"
(to use Roscoe Pound's phrase 39) was to adjudication. Justice
Owen Roberts expressed this attitude with naive candor: "When
an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of
the Government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Con-
stitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged
and to decide whether the latter squares with the former.124 0 Sim-
ilarly when using history; the judge or lawyer need only lay the
interpretation next to the historical facts and see if it squares.
A first-year graduate student in History learns the fallacy of
these assumptions in the first few weeks of the methods seminar.
Historical facts are inert and in themselves meaningless. They
take on meaning only through interpretation. Interpretation in
turn is not an automatic process; it begins with the way the histo-
rian asks questions, and at all stages is influenced by the histo-
rian's own biases (including ideology). History is not made or
238. D. FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL
THOUGHT 4 (1970).
239. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
240. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
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given by God; it is the product of human minds and therefore
liable to error, either of verification or interpretation. There is bet-
ter and worse history, and certainly false history, but there is no
history that is not free of human fallibility.
As a corrective to these lay assumptions, it is useful to return to
another matter that comes up early in the methods seminar. The
neophyte historian is soon introduced to the famous dictum of the
nineteenth century historian Leopold von Ranke, who stated that
his History of the Roman and German Peoples would present the
past "wie es eigentlich gewesen fist]": "as it really happened." 24'
Adherents of the jurisprudence of original intent apparently think
that they have the key to an understanding of the past as it really
was. This is a dangerous delusion, as any historian could tell
them. Our knowledge even of the facts of the past is imperfect at
best,242 and when we try to divine so intangible a thing as motiva-
tion and intent, we provoke the gods if we boast of certainty.
Yet if the Ranke dictum is a caution against unfounded and
misplaced confidence in our knowledge of the past, it also has a
positive message for us. The past can be known, and it has an
integrity that must be respected. Though these two basic proposi-
tions are often abused by being treated simplistically, they are
true, and stand as our assurance against the unprincipled relativ-
ism that produces law-office history.
A final comment: the earliest scholarly survey of the subject of
this paper was Jacobus tenBroek's dissertation, published serially
in the 1938-39 California Law Review as "Use by the United
States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Con-
struction. 243 While his contribution was valuable and has served
as the foundation for later studies, our more matured view a half
century later enables us to see that he erred in a basic assumption,
namely, that history is an extrinsic aid. I hope that the sampling
in this paper of the uses of history has demonstrated that history
is often intrinsic to constitutional adjudication, providing the ini-
tial assumptions, the thought structure, the terms of discourse, the
backdrop of human experience, or all of these, for many instances
of constitutional adjudication. Its consequences have not always
been beneficent, but its influence is pervasive.
241. L. VON RANKE, GESCHICHTEN DER ROMANISCHEN UND GERMANISCHEN VOL-
KER VON 1492 BIS 1535, vii (2nd ed. 1874).
242. See, e.g., on the technical difficulties with the documentary record of the Phila-
delphia convention, Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Docu-
mentary Record, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1986).
243. 26 CALIF. L. REv. 287-308, 437-454, 664-681 (1938); 27 CALIF. L. REv. 157-
421 (1939) (title varies).
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